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THE NAME OF THE ROSE
At a recent conference, Martha Minow presented a paper in
which she discussed the significance of the fact that lawyers refer to
cases by a shorthand: The last names of the litigants stand for the
entire case and what it means for the lawyers. This shorthand obliterates the human dimensions of the case, which, Minow argued,
demonstrates something interesting about the way in which lawyers
think about the law.t
On hearing the paper presented, I noted that the shorthand
Minow identified is not universal, and I wondered whether there
might be some significant pattern beyond the one she was concerned
with. What follows is a brief sketch of a completely informal investigation of how cases are named.
First, there is Tarble, who has a whole Case named after him.
There is also Rayburn, who is in the peculiar position that he lost
his Case largely because, as it turned out, it wasn't his after all.
Second, there are the cases which appear as Cases in the Supreme
Court Reports: Passenger, License, Slaughterhouse, Civil Rights,
Selective Draft Law, Employers' Liability, Second Employers' Liability, and Penn Central Merger. Third, there are the cases that have
received a shorthand designation that serves as an alternate unofficial name: the Insular cases, the Pentagon Papers case, the Steel
Seizure case, the desegregation cases, the abortion cases, the school
prayer cases.
Consider some explanations for the second and third categories. What about law-and-economics? Calling something a Case
serves the end of efficiency when several individual names of the
litigants would create an excessively long citation in the standard
"A v. B" form. This explanation is inadequate, however, because
many cases with long names are reported as A v. B in the standard
form, some single name cases combine only two cases, and many
opinions are given the name of a single case even though several
cases are decided together.2
What about critical legal studies? Calling something a Case
often appears to identify it as dealing in some way with aspects of
I. For a casebook that insists on identifying the first name of everyone who is men·
tioned in a case, see R. COVER, 0. FISS, & J. RESNIK, PROCEDIJRE (1988).
2. If Brown v. Board of Education won't count, consider Miranda v. Arizona.
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subordination, as in Slaughterhouse and Civil Rights.3 This practice
might result from the Court's need to drive from its consciousness
the fact that it is an instrument of power in a society riven with
unjustified hierarchy. This explanation is inadequate, however, because it fails to explain why this particular subset of cases dealing
with subordination is treated in this way, and because not every
Case deals with subordination.
What about doctrinal analysis? Calling something a Case
might seem to identify it as both controversial and the foundation of
significant later developments. This explanation is inadequate,
however. It does not explain why this subset of controversial and
foundational cases receives special treatment (consider Miranda).
Also, not every Case is controversial and foundational.
Finally, we might notice Roe v. Wade, in which no one appears
on either side of the "versus." The identity of Roe is obliterated by
the anonymous name proceeding, and, although there is a real person named Henry Wade, he plainly is not the person/entity whose
interests stand adverse to Roe's in the litigation. We might note
here the impact that the film "The Silent Scream" had on antichoice propaganda, as an indication that obliterating identities
through case names does not have any necessary political tilt.
Doubtless there is more to be said about the practices of naming cases in various ways. Further research is desperately needed.
Mark Tushnet4

3. I would defend the proposition that this is true of Passenger and License as well,
given the relation between the doctrinal points at issue in those cases and the issue of slavery.
4. Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center.

